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TERRORISM ON TRIAL: THE PRESIDENT’S
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ORDER
THE PROSECUTION OF SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS BY MILITARY COMMISSION
CHRISTOPHER M. EVANS
INTRODUCTION
On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush, in his capacity as commander in chief, promulgated a Military Order authorizing
the trial of noncitizens suspected of complicity in the brutal attacks on
1
September 11, 2001, before specially convened military commissions.
The Military Order of November 13 establishes that, unlike trials in
federal district courts, judicial review of the commission proceedings
2
will be strictly prohibited. The commissions also differ considerably
from the courts-martial provided under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ).3 Courts-martial are appealable on all issues of fact

Copyright © 2002 by Christopher M. Evans.
1. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Military
Order]. “Military commissions,” as discussed here, are a type of military tribunal, which is a
blanket term that also includes courts-martial and courts of inquiry. This distinction is indicated
in the Uniform Code of Military Justice:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent
jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war
may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.
10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (emphasis added).
2. Military Order § 7(b)(2), supra note 1, at 57,835–36. So long as the military commissions are not convened within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, denial of judicial
review will likely pass constitutional muster. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786
(1950) (declining to extend constitutional protections to enemy aliens tried before military
commission outside the sovereign territory of the United States for violations of the laws of
war). The Supreme Court has “characterized as ‘well-established’ the ‘power of the military to
exercise jurisdiction over . . . enemy belligerents, prisoners of war, or others charged with violating the laws of war.’” Id. at 786 (quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoka, 327 U.S. 304, 313–14
(1946)).
3. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2000).
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and law4 and, furthermore, adhere to strict rules of evidence.5 The
commissions, on the other hand, only follow evidentiary guidelines
established by the Secretary of Defense in his discretion.6
The Military Order creating these commissions reflects the Bush
administration’s trepidation about prosecuting suspected terrorists
through the ordinary criminal justice system, which, it is feared, could
lead to substantial delays and even acquittals based on legal techni7
calities. President Bush’s decision to convene military commissions is
also predicated upon the belief that terrorist acts amount to acts of
war, and that, accordingly, suspected terrorists should be treated as
war criminals.8 However, despite the president’s repeated pronouncements that the September 11 attacks constituted violations of
the law of war, thus empowering him to convene military commissions,9 the November 13 Order has been heavily criticized as an unconstitutional expansion of executive authority with the potential for
significant abuse.10 By contrast, supporters of the commissions maintain that the Military Order is a valid exercise of the president’s
commander in chief power, and that the president’s broad latitude to

4. 10 U.S.C. § 866(c).
5. See 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (explaining that rules and procedures for courts-martial shall
apply principles of law and rules of evidence generally recognized in federal district courts).
6. See Military Order § 4(c)(3), supra note 1, at 57,835 (stating that evidence will be admitted “as would, in the opinion of the presiding officer of the military commission . . . have probative value to a reasonable person”); see also id. § 6(a) (requiring the Secretary of Defense to “issue such orders and regulations as may be necessary to carry out provisions of the order”); see
also Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, March 21, 2002, at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (detailing procedures for trials by military commission of suspected terrorists, including the rights
to a presumption of innocence, to choose counsel, to see the prosecution’s evidence, to a public
trial, and to remain silent).
7. See Anthony Lewis, Dust in Our Eyes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at A21 (attacking
President Bush’s order as “extraordinarily ill-drafted”).
8. See Military Order § 1(e), supra note 1, at 57,833 (“International terrorists, including
members of al Qaeda, have carried out attacks on the United States . . . on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict.”).
9. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Support for Bush’s Antiterror Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2001, at B6 (detailing legal grounds for the president’s exceedingly broad powers); David E.
Sanger, President Defends Military Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A1 (quoting the
president’s statement that “[t]he enemy has declared war on us”).
10. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Bush Can’t Rely On FDR Precedent, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at
M3 (arguing that the commissions offer the potential for abuse); Katharine Q. Seelye, In Letter,
300 Law Professors Oppose Tribunals Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2001, at A1 (citing a letter that
originated at Yale Law School that asserts that the commissions are legally deficient).
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protect national security permits the Bush administration to proclaim
war against terrorism.11
This Note analyzes the president’s legal predicate for authorizing
military commissions in response to the attacks on September 11. It
12
concludes that, under Ex parte Quirin, the president’s Order is constitutional. The attacks of September 11 were so catastrophic in their
purpose and effect as to constitute “hostile acts” in violation of the
laws of war.13 Because the attacks commenced an imperfect or “quasi
war,” the jus in bello was triggered, thus giving the president valid
authority to convene the commissions to punish these acts as war
crimes under Ex parte Quirin.14 This Note maintains, however, that
the Military Order is nevertheless an extralegal action because it is
inconsistent with existing international law. The laws of war, a subset
of the law of nations, apply only to state actors, not to independent
terrorist organizations such as those believed to be responsible for the
September 11 atrocities.15 Despite the administration’s attempt to effect a rapid change in customary international law so as to apply the
16
laws of war to nonstate actors, such a change, even if possible, cannot be made retroactive to the events of September 11. Thus, these
commissions lack legal justification under international law.
Part I of this Note briefly summarizes the events of September 11
and then discusses the November 13 Military Order. Part II examines
the historical precedent for convening military commissions to prosecute war crimes, and it also considers the various arguments supporting the president’s Military Order. Part III describes the unique factual background and holding of Ex parte Quirin, and then analyzes

11. See, e.g., Glaberson, supra note 9, at B6 (“The precedents are overwhelmingly in favor
of what the president is doing.”).
12. 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (upholding President Roosevelt’s power to establish military
commissions for violations of the law of war by enemy saboteurs during World War II).
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra notes 105–113 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 75 (1999)
(discussing the principle of full legal personality in international law and the procedural protections it can invoke).
16. On DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism:
Hearing On Review of Military Terrorism Tribunals Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Hearings] 2001 WL 26187921 (testimony of Scott L. Silliman,
Executive Director for the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, Duke University
School of Law).
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the applicability of this opinion to the acts of September 11. Despite
the clear differences between the Bush administration’s military campaign and the World War II context in which Ex parte Quirin was decided, this Note concludes that this opinion provides a valid constitutional basis for the November 13 Military Order. Part IV discusses the
inapplicability of the laws of war to terrorist organizations and the
Bush administration’s attempt to bring about a sudden change in existing customary international law. Finally, this Note considers the
policy implications of using military commissions, as well as the administration’s desired change in customary international law. It is argued here that, despite its constitutionality, the Military Order is both
unwise and inconsistent with existing law.
I. THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS AND THE PRESIDENT’S MILITARY
ORDER ESTABLISHING MILITARY COMMISSIONS
The brutal acts of September 11, 2001, closely resembled a surprise enemy attack both in their planning and in their devastating
consequences. The destruction of the World Trade Center in New
York City and portions of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., killed
17
approximately three thousand people. Although parallels have been
drawn between these events and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in
1941, which left 2,403 people dead,18 the attacks of September 11 were
worse in terms of the number of casualties suffered, and also marked
the largest killing of civilians on the U.S. mainland in the history of
the United States.19 So grave were these attacks that on September 14,
2001, President Bush proclaimed a national emergency.20 The events
of September 11 also resulted in a novel and complex political situation. The attack on Pearl Harbor was attributable to a hostile nation
then at war with U.S. allies. The suicide missions of September 11,
however, were not linked to an identifiable state but, rather, to the
loosely knit al Qaeda terrorist network allegedly directed by suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden, and actively supported by the

17. Yochi J. Dreazen, Power-Plant Operators Are Alerted to Threat of Potential Terrorist
Plot, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, at A4.
18. THE ECONOMIST, The New Enemy, Sept. 15, 2001, at 15.
19. THE ECONOMIST, The Day the World Changed, Sept. 15, 2001, at 13.
20. Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001) reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 1621 (2000).
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Taliban government in Afghanistan,21 a rogue regime never officially
recognized by the United States.22
President Bush made clear in the aftermath of the attacks that
the United States would treat these acts as casus belli, calling them
23
“not acts of terrorism but acts of war.” The Military Order of November 13 reiterated the belief that the terrorist attacks were so severe as to have created a state of armed conflict, thus enabling President Bush to establish military commissions to prosecute those
24
responsible. Specifically, the Order provides:
To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective
conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it
is necessary for individuals subject to this order pursuant to section 2
hereof to be detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations of
25
the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.

The Order cites as its legal basis the president’s power as commander in chief vested in him by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force
26
Joint Resolution passed on September 18, 2001, and sections 821 and
27
836 of the UCMJ. The Order also cites President Bush’s declaration
of a national emergency, and states that “this emergency constitutes
an urgent and compelling government interest, and that issuance of
this order is necessary to meet the emergency.”28

21. See Elizabeth Bumiller, Bush Pledges Attack on Afghanistan Unless It Surrenders Bin
Laden Now, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at A1 (discussing President Bush’s address to Congress
on September 20, 2001, in which he demanded that the Taliban hand over members of the al
Qaeda network to the United States).
22. See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Status of Detainees at
Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/2002020713.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter Press Release] (explaining that al
Qaeda is a foreign terrorist group, and thus its members are not entitled to POW status);
Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2002, at A1 (explaining President Bush’s application of the Geneva convention to Taliban captives but not to al Qaeda detainees).
23. The New Enemy, supra note 18, at 16.
24. See Military Order §§ 1(a)–(g), supra note 1, at 57,833 (detailing findings in support of
military commissions).
25. Id. § 1(e).
26. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
27. 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 836 (2000) (stating that the jurisdiction of courts-martial is nonexclusive, and giving the president the authority to prescribe rules for use in courts-martial and other
military tribunals).
28. Military Order § 1(g), supra note 1, at 57,834.
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During the operations in Afghanistan, which commenced several
weeks after September 11, when the Taliban refused to hand bin
29
Laden over to the United States, U.S. forces captured various mem30
bers of al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. Beginning in January,
2002, these captives were transferred to the United States Naval Base
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where they remain confined, presumably
31
awaiting trial before military commissions.
II. ASSERTED SOURCES OF THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY TO
CONVENE MILITARY COMMISSIONS
A. Historical Practice
The November 13 Military Order was an extraordinary measure.
No president had authorized the use of such commissions within the
United States in over half a century. The Bush administration’s decision to do so, however, is not without precedent. The laws of war
have long recognized that military commissions can be convened to
32
prosecute war crimes during an armed conflict. “The [military]
commission,” as one authority notes, “is simply an instrumentality for
the more efficient execution of the laws of war.”33 There is, moreover,
a long-established history of using military commissions to try those
accused of “[v]iolations of the laws and usages of war” dating back to
the early years of the Republic.34 Throughout the Revolutionary War,
a number of enemy spies were tried and convicted before military

29. See Peter Baker, Taliban Preparing Capital for War; Trenches Are Dug, Men Conscripted, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2001, at A1 (describing militia fortification of Kabul in anticipation of American forces after the failure of the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden to the
United States).
30. See John Mintz, Extended Detention in Cuba Mulled, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2002, at
A16 (envisioning the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to which al Qaeda
captives were sent, as a “terrorist penal colony for years to come”).
31. Id.
32. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 330 (2d ed. 1920); see also Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 38–43 (1942) (explaining that the Constitution does not require offenses against the law of war to be tried before a jury). The “laws of war,” part of the law of nations, are comprised of both treaties and general, or customary, international law. See Alfred P.
Rubin, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 25,
1985), in 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 109, 111 (1985) (discussing the sources and principles
underlying the laws of war in the context of terrorism).
33. WINTHROP, supra note 32, at 330.
34. Id. at 332.
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commissions.35 George Washington personally ordered the executions
of several of those convicted.36
Military commissions were also used extensively during the Civil
37
War to try offenses against the laws of war. One notable trial before
a military commission during the Civil War involved Confederate
saboteurs who attempted to disrupt the Union war effort by burning
down various buildings in New York City.38 A Confederate army captain, Robert Kennedy, was found to have attempted, while in dis39
guise, to set fire to several of the city’s buildings. Tried before a military commission in 1865, Kennedy was sentenced to hang for acting as
a spy and “undertaking to carry on irregular and unlawful warfare.”40
Another Confederate saboteur, John Y. Beall, was tried before a
military commission for his role in the hijacking of a Union vessel and
for his unsuccessful attempt to derail a train in New York State—also
41
while in disguise. Adjudged a spy and a guerilla, Beall was also sentenced to be hanged.42 The history of the Civil War is replete with
similar cases in which Confederate spies and saboteurs were tried,
43
sentenced and put to death by military commissions.
Constitutionally speaking, presidential authority to establish such
commissions, derived from the president’s commander in chief pow44
ers, is limited. The Constitution vests the president, as commander
in chief, with the power to wage wars that Congress has declared, and
to execute all laws passed by Congress defining and punishing offenses committed against the law of nations, including those govern-

35. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 42 n.14 (1942) (describing numerous cases tried before
commissions during the American Revolution); see also WINTHROP, supra note 32, at 832–33
(describing similar trials conducted during the Mexican War).
36. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 42 n.14.
37. See Spencer J. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justice For War Criminals of Invisible
Armies: A New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 349, 368
(1996) (describing various instances in which military commissions were used to prosecute Confederate soldiers during the Civil War).
38. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 32 n.10.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. (discussing several examples of Confederate spies tried before military commissions).
44. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (stating that “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States”).
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ing the conduct of war, the jus in bello.45 Article 21 of the UCMJ provides that military commissions have “concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may
46
be tried by military commissions . . . or other military tribunals.”
Thus, assuming there is an underlying statute defining certain acts as
violations of the law of war (or if recognized war crimes were committed during the course of an armed conflict), the president may, in his
capacity as commander in chief, constitutionally establish military
commissions to punish those acts.
B. The President’s Power Over Foreign Affairs
Congress never formally declared war with regard to the Bush
administration’s military action in Afghanistan; and because the September 11 attacks are believed to have been committed by terrorist
organizations without state sponsorship, it is unclear whether the attacks constitute war crimes.47 Thus, the current scenario does not fit
easily alongside the historical precedents for the establishment of
military commissions to punish war crimes. Officials within the Bush
administration have employed a range of arguments with which they
seek to justify the November 13 Military Order. The administration
has argued, for example, that the United States is in a state of armed
conflict,48 and that the president has very broad powers to protect national security in wartime.49 In making this argument, supporters of
the Military Order have cited United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.50 as a plausible basis for President Bush’s Order to establish the
military commissions.51 At issue in Curtiss-Wright was a congressional
joint resolution that prohibited arms sales to Paraguay and Bolivia,
which were at war, and conditioned its continuance on President
Roosevelt’s issuance of a proclamation as to its effect in helping to re52
store peace to that region. The Curtiss-Wright Corporation, charged

45. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26.
46. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
47. Rubin, supra note 32, at 111.
48. See, e.g., Military Order § 1(a), supra note 1, at 57,833 (stating that the terrorist attacks
have “created a state of armed conflict”).
49. Glaberson, supra note 9, at B6 (describing lawyers’ efforts to assemble a “talkingpoints brief in defense of the administration’s actions”).
50. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
51. Glaberson, supra note 9, at B6 (citing a recent brief written by former Deputy Attorney
General George Terwilliger in support of the Order).
52. 299 U.S. at 314–15.
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with violating the arms embargo, argued that because the joint resolution was conditioned on a discretionary presidential proclamation regarding a foreign conflict, it constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive.53
The Court drew a dichotomy between the powers of the federal
government over foreign relations on the one hand, and domestic affairs on the other. “The broad statement that the federal government
can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the
Constitution,” Justice Sutherland wrote, “is categorically true only in
54
respect of our internal affairs.” Curtiss-Wright thus established the
president as the “sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
55
its sole representative with foreign nations.” Thus, according to
Curtiss-Wright, the president’s power to act as the federal government’s sole organ in external affairs does not, unlike the domestic
56
sphere, require congressional authorization. Bush administration
lawyers contend that this plenary and exclusive power over foreign
affairs is a valid basis upon which the president can convene military
57
commissions.
This argument, however, is not easily applied to the present
situation. First, whether or not the United States is “at war,” as some
have maintained, is debatable. It thus cannot be assumed automatically that the president was acting in the realm of “external affairs”
when he issued the November 13 Order, as the “sole organ” theory
58
would require. Justice Sutherland emphasized that the president’s
“sole organ” power is limited to foreign affairs whereas in domestic
affairs the president is constrained by the need for congressional
authorization.59 It is beyond this Note’s scope to categorize precisely
where the November 13 Military Order falls on the spectrum between
domestic and foreign affairs, but it does seem to have some implications for the domestic sphere. For example, the Order has a law en53. Id. at 315.
54. Id. at 315–16.
55. Id. at 319.
56. Id. at 320; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 402, at
213 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that, in the domestic sphere, the president’s constitutional role “is thus
largely ancillary to that of Congress”).
57. See Glaberson, supra note 9, at B6 (“[S]upporters of the measures have begun to outline a legal defense of the actions, saying that the president has broad powers to protect national
security in wartime . . . .”).
58. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
59. See id. at 315–16 (distinguishing the scope of the exercise of general executive power
over internal affairs from the exercise of power over foreign affairs).
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forcement component, as it provides for the prosecution by military
commissions of violations of the laws of war and “other applicable
laws.”60 Furthermore, other departments and agencies such as the FBI
are obliged, to the maximum extent permitted by law, to assist the
Secretary of Defense “as he may request to implement this order.”61
This provision, which pertains not only to external relations but also
to domestic security, may serve as a basis for the detention of suspected terrorists who may be turned over to the Department of Defense for trial before a commission. Therefore, in contrast to the
presidential proclamation at issue in Curtiss-Wright, which fit clearly
into the realm of external relations, President Bush’s Order has significant implications for domestic affairs. Curtiss-Wright’s “sole organ” theory is, accordingly, inapplicable here.
C. “Crisis Government” and Prerogative Power
Proponents of the Military Order have, similarly, invoked the
concept of crisis government62 and the need for undefined power in
63
the national government during certain crises. This theory is based
on the notion of prerogative power applied to presidential actions of
an extraconstitutional nature. The concept was first articulated by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 23, in which he asserted:
The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite,
and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed
on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought
to be co-extensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils
64
which are appointed to preside over the common defense.

60. Military Order § 1(e), supra note 1, at 57,833.
61. Id. at 57,385.
62. For a discussion of crisis government, see Martin S. Sheffer, Does Absolute Power Corrupt Absolutely?, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 233, 233–34 (1999) :
. . . [R]eality . . . demonstrates that war and peace are not the same thing, cannot coexist in the same place at the same time, and constitutional provisions applicable in
time of peace may not be equally applicable in time of war. In other words, the Constitution does not function normally in abnormal times.
See also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1957, at 3 (4th ed.
1957) (discussing how the indefiniteness of executive power makes it particularly responsive to
national emergencies).
63. See Glaberson, supra note 9, at B6 (explaining the legal justifications offered by supporters of the “[second] Bush Administration’s antiterrorism crackdown”).
64. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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The theory of crisis government as a basis for the Military Order
is, however, palpably inapposite here. Although President Bush pro65
claimed a national emergency in the wake of the attacks, such actions or statements cannot serve as a valid legal predicate for the November 13 Order. “The Constitution,” as one scholar has explained,
“recognizes no ‘emergency powers,’ whether for the President, or for
66
other branches of the federal government.” Even in declared emergencies, the president’s powers are limited to those either conferred
by the Constitution or authorized by Congress.67 In Ex parte Milli68
gan, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that emergency powers,
even during times of armed conflict, could be a basis for the president’s authority to establish military commissions to prosecute war
69
crimes. “No doctrine,” wrote Justice Davis, “involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented . . . than that any of [the Constitution’s] provisions can be suspended during any of the great exi70
gencies of government.” Milligan involved the issue of trying a U.S.
citizen before a commission during the Civil War when courts of law
were open and available, and is therefore more significant here because of the politically charged context in which it was decided than
for its actual holding.71 Nevertheless, Milligan’s rejection of emergency powers as a basis for the president’s authority to establish military commissions remains binding.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NOVEMBER 13 MILITARY
ORDER UNDER EX PARTE QUIRIN
A. The Legal Precedent
Both proponents and critics of the Bush administration’s plan to
use military commissions have invoked the Supreme Court’s decision

65. Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 1621 (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-89).
66. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 53 (2d ed. 1996).
67. Id.
68. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
69. Id. at 118–27.
70. Id. at 121.
71. The November 13 Military Order applies only to noncitizens. Military Order §2, supra
note 1, at 57,833–34. The current situation is also distinguishable from the Civil War context in
which Milligan was decided because it is unclear whether the United States is technically at war.
See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
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in Ex parte Quirin,72 upholding President Roosevelt’s authority to establish military commissions in the United States for the prosecution
of war crimes during the Second World War. Proponents cite Quirin
as a clear affirmation of the president’s power to convene such commissions for violations of the laws of war.73 Skeptics of the November
13 Order, on the other hand, are careful to distinguish the specific fac74
tual context in which Quirin was decided from the present setting. A
careful analysis of Quirin is therefore necessary, as the constitutionality of President Bush’s Military Order, if challenged in court, will
likely hinge in large part on how this decision is interpreted.
Quirin involved a petition for habeas corpus, filed by suspected
German saboteurs captured within the United States during the Second World War, to challenge the constitutionality of their trial by
military commission when the federal district courts were open and
available. The saboteurs landed in two teams on July 12 and 17, 1942,
75
off the shores of Long Island and Florida, respectively. All were
76
agents of Nazi Germany. They arrived armed with various explosive
devices intending to disrupt America’s war effort by destroying transportation and industrial facilities throughout the United States.77 The
saboteurs were, however, apprehended and taken into custody by the
78
FBI. Based on concerns similar to those of the Bush administration
about proceeding through the criminal justice system, Attorney General Francis Biddle prepared a memorandum for the president recommending that, as commander in chief, he appoint a special military
commission to prosecute the suspects for violations of the law of
war.79 Thus, on July 2, 1942, President Roosevelt issued an order es72. 317 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1942) (upholding a trial of alleged unlawful combatants [“enemy
belligerents”] before a military commission for violations of the laws of war upon entry into the
United States in a time of war for the purpose of executing hostile acts).
73. Glaberson, supra note 9, at B6.
74. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 10, at M3 (contrasting the World War II setting in which
President Roosevelt established commissions to prosecute the saboteurs with the present circumstances).
75. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942).
76. Id. at 20–21.
77. Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of
the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 62 (1980).
78. Id.
79. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 328–30 (1962); see also Belknap, supra note
77, at 75 (“‘The time may now have come,’ the government’s brief observed, ‘when the exigencies of . . . war must force a recognition that every foot of this country is within the theatre of
operations.’ The test of whether or not the civil courts were open to punish crimes, it was argued, was now ‘unrealistic.’” (citing Brief for Respondent, Burger v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1 (1942))).
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tablishing a military commission for the trial of the saboteurs “for offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War” adopted by
Congress.80 Roosevelt then issued a Proclamation declaring that “all
persons who are . . . citizens . . . of any nation at war with the United
States . . . and who during time of war . . . are charged with . . . violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the
81
jurisdiction of military tribunals.” The military commission convened on July 8, 1942, and proceeded to try the eight saboteurs,82 six
of whom were eventually sentenced to death.83
Chief Justice Stone’s opinion in Quirin dismissed the petitioners’
argument, based on Ex parte Milligan, that as long as civil courts were
available, the president was without authority to establish military
84
commissions. The Court stated that the Constitution does not require that offenses against the law of war be tried before a jury.85 The
opinion also established at the outset the presumption that presidential actions taken pursuant to the commander in chief power during
wartime are valid, unless those actions are clearly in conflict with the
86
Constitution. Chief Justice Stone wrote, “[T]he detention and trial
of petitioners—ordered by the President in the declared exercise of
his powers as Commander in Chief of the Army in time of war and of
grave public danger—are not to be set aside by the courts without the
clear conviction” that they are in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States.87
The Court found no such conflict with regard to President Roosevelt’s Military Order, as it was promulgated during wartime pursu88
ant to Articles of War adopted by Congress. The Court then went on
to determine who may be tried before military commissions for violations of the law of war. The Court distinguished carefully between
“lawful combatants,” who are subject to capture and detention as

80. 7 Fed. Reg. 5,103, 5,103 (1942); see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22 (summarizing the president’s actions in appointing a military commission).
81. Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5,101, 5,101 (1942); see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22–
23 (discussing the Proclamation).
82. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 23–24.
83. BIDDLE, supra note 79, at 339.
84. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24–25.
85. Id. at 40.
86. Id. at 25.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 28.
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prisoners of war by opposing military forces, and “unlawful combatants” who may be brought before military commissions:
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines
of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who
without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of
waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples
of belligerents who are generally deemed . . . offenders against the
89
law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.

The eight German saboteurs had been apprehended wearing civilian clothes rather than their military uniforms “during time of
90
war,” with the intent to commit “hostile acts involving destruction of
life or property,”91 and were acting as agents of an enemy nation at
war with the United States—the Third Reich.92 The saboteurs were
accordingly found to be unlawful combatants, triable before a military
commission for violations of the law of war.93
Thus, under Quirin, the requirements for a suspect to be an unlawful combatant subject to trial by military commission for violations
of the law of war may be summarized as follows: There must be entry
into the United States in a time of war for the purpose of committing
hostile acts by “enemy belligerents” disguised in civilian clothing instead of their military uniforms.94 It should be observed that “hostile
acts,” as defined in Quirin, are not limited to assaults on military targets.95
B. The Applicability of Ex parte Quirin to the Attacks of September
11
It is clear from the preceding discussion of Quirin that the situation in which President Roosevelt authorized military commissions to
be established was entirely different from the context in which President Bush promulgated his Military Order on November 13. President Roosevelt authorized commissions in the midst of a war declared
by Congress, and the eight German saboteurs were acting as agents of
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 31.
Id. at 35
Id.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 37.
Id.
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a declared enemy state. Here, by contrast, the United States was not
in a state of armed conflict on the morning of September 11, prior to
the attacks. Moreover, it is unclear whether the suspected terrorists
were sponsored by any recognized state.96 Critics of the Bush administration’s Military Order thus contend that because the United States
was not at war as of the morning of September 11, the attacks cannot
97
be considered violations of the law of war. It is maintained, therefore, that Quirin is inapposite because of the unique factual situation
in which it was decided.98 This argument is predicated on the idea that
a declared war, or at least a state of armed conflict, must already exist
for there to be a violation of the law of war.99 “The notion of war
crimes,” one scholar has explained, “presupposes a war . . . .”100
Critics of the November 13 Order also distinguish Quirin because President Roosevelt, unlike President Bush, acted pursuant to
101
an express congressional declaration of war. Thus, under Justice
Jackson’s typology of presidential power in his oft-cited concurrence
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,102 President Roosevelt’s
authority was at its zenith, as he was acting pursuant to an express
congressional authorization.103 It is argued, therefore, that even if one
were to accept the assertion that the United States was engaged in
some sort of armed conflict with such groups as al Qaeda prior to the
September 11 attacks, President Bush lacks the clear authority that
was available to President Roosevelt.104
Despite these obvious differences, a close reading of Quirin reveals that it may nevertheless serve as a valid predicate for the Bush
96. The issue of state sponsorship is addressed in Part IV, infra.
97. See Hearings, supra note 16 (testimony of Scott L. Silliman).
98. See id.; Fisher, supra note 10, at M3 (drawing attention to the unique wartime situation
in which Quirin was decided).
99. Hearings, supra note 16 (testimony of Scott L. Silliman).
100. DONALD A. WELLS, WAR CRIMES AND LAWS OF WAR 41 (2d ed. 1991).
101. See Hearings, supra note 16 (testimony of Scott L. Silliman).
102. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
103. See id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that presidential power is at its greatest
when exercised in conjunction with Congressional authority). According to Justice Jackson’s
typology, when the president acts pursuant to either an explicit or implied congressional
authorization, his authority is at its maximum. Id. at 635. When the president acts without either
a congressional grant or denial of authority, his power falls within a “zone of twilight in which
he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.” Id. at
637. However, when the president acts incompatibly with the express or implied will of Congress, his authority is at its “lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.” Id.
104. See Hearings, supra note 16 (testimony of Scott L. Silliman).
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administration’s Military Order of November 13. The attacks of September 11 constituted hostile acts so severe in both their purpose and
their effect as to be war crimes; these acts therefore commenced a
state of armed conflict, thus giving the president the authority to establish military commissions to punish the acts as violations of the law
of war. While there has not been a congressional declaration of war as
there was in Quirin, the United States was, as of the attacks, engaged—and has remained engaged—in a state of “quasi war.”105
The text of the November 13 Military Order indicates that it was
promulgated partly on the notion that the attacks of September 11
were so severe that they rose to the level of “hostile acts” under the
law of war, thus giving rise to an armed conflict. Section 1(a) of the
Order states that “[i]nternational terrorists, including members of al
Qaeda, have carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and military personnel . . . within the United States on a scale that has created
a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United States
Armed Forces.”106 This idea is based upon the argument that catastrophic terrorist acts can be so grave as to rise to the level of war
crimes. The theory is, essentially, that terrorist attacks constitute acts
of aggression, target innocent civilians for indiscriminate assault, and
are carried out by irregular saboteur forces that neither identify
themselves nor openly bear arms.107 Terrorist acts, thus defined, are
not functionally different from the crimes for which, for example, the
eight saboteurs in Quirin were charged and prosecuted. Such acts, it is
maintained, should be regarded as war crimes or crimes against humanity.108 President Bush has both implicitly and explicitly made this
argument in various public pronouncements since September 11.
“Non-U.S. citizens who plan and/or commit mass murder,” the president has asserted, “are more than criminal suspects. They are unlawful combatants who seek to destroy our country and our way of
life.”109 It is highly significant, moreover, that the United States’
NATO allies appear to have recognized the September 11 attacks as
the inception of an armed conflict. In response to the September 11
105. See generally Fisher, supra note 10 (criticizing analogies between the Bush and Roosevelt decisions to authorize military commissions).
106. Military Order § 1(a), supra note 1, at 833 (emphasis added).
107. See Crona & Richardson, supra note 37, at 359 (citing YOSSEF BODANSKY, TARGET
AMERICAN & THE WEST 2–3 (1993)).
108. See id. at 351 (citing the U.S. government’s opening statement, during the second
World Trade Center bombing trial, that “[t]his is a case involving a war”).
109. Sanger, supra note 9, at A1.

EVANS IN FINAL READ.DOC

2002]

06/03/02 12:06 PM

TERRORISM ON TRIAL

1847

attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of its Charter on mutual defense for
the first time in its history, which binds the signatories to regard an attack on one member as an attack on all.110
The assertion that the terrorist acts of September 11 could rise to
the level of war crimes or crimes against humanity finds support in
accepted principles of the law of war. In his famous treatise on military law and the law of war, William Winthrop explained, “[i]t is forbidden by the usages of civilized nations to take the lives of, or commit violence against, non-combatants and private individuals not in
111
arms, including women and children . . . .” Such acts, the treatise
112
explains, constitute illegal warfare. This well-established principle is
based on the writings of early war theoreticians who had proposed
bans on the use of incendiaries, as well as the strategy of making deliberate attacks on civilian populations.113
There can be little doubt, therefore, that according to accepted
114
principles of the laws of war, the attacks of September 11 were severe enough in terms of their purpose and effect to constitute war
crimes. However, under Quirin, for the perpetrators of these assaults
to have the status of unlawful belligerents, and thus be subject to trial
by military commissions, the acts must have been committed “in time
of war.”115 As the Court in Quirin explained, “those who during time
of war pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own . . . for
the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by
military commission.”116
It is widely accepted that the assailants of September 11 and their
accomplices entered the United States for the purpose of committing
“hostile acts involving destruction of life or property” on a horrendous scale, and tragically were successful. Under Quirin, therefore,
117
these attacks would seem to constitute “hostile and war-like act[s]”

110. The Day the World Changed, supra note 19, at 14.
111. WINTHROP, supra note 32, at 315.
112. Id.
113. See WELLS, supra note 100, at 73 (noting, for example, that “[e]arly Roman Catholic
Church Councils had proposed bans on the use of incendiaries, poisons, and the crossbow, as
well as against the strategy of making deliberate war on civilians”).
114. See id. at 73–85 (explaining general tenets of the laws of war); WINTHROP, supra note
32, at 315–21 (same).
115. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942).
116. Id. at 35.
117. Id. at 37.
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capable of subjecting those responsible to punishment by military
commissions. The real issue, then, is whether the attacks can be considered to have been executed “in time of war” (thus giving those responsible the status of “unlawful combatants”) as Quirin would seem
to require.
In describing the German saboteurs’ unlawful warlike acts, the
Quirin Court held that, “[b]y passing our boundaries for such [unlawful] purposes without uniform or other emblem signifying their belligerent status . . . such enemies become unlawful belligerents subject
to trial and punishment [by military commission].”118 This statement,
as applied to the facts in Quirin, meant that once the saboteurs had
passed surreptitiously and in civilian clothing into the United States
with the intent to commit hostile and warlike acts, they acquired the
status of unlawful belligerents, even though they were apprehended
before they could execute their scheme. Applying this framework to
the events of September 11, it would appear that once the terrorists
boarded their respective planes with the intent to commit hostile,
warlike acts, they similarly acquired the status of unlawful belligerents.
In Quirin, of course, the existence of a declared war meant that
the saboteurs’ unlawful acts were necessarily committed in wartime.
However, as one international law scholar has argued, “as soon as the
activities of any armed group reach the level at which the laws of war
should apply, those laws must apply even if the enemy army is called
119
‘terrorist’ or engages in acts which violate the laws of war.” As discussed previously, there can be little doubt that the September 11 attacks were severe enough to constitute war crimes or crimes against
humanity.120 These acts of aggression, as the November 13 Order
121
states, created a state of armed conflict. Therefore, according to the
analytical framework of Quirin, upon the event of the plane hijackings, the terrorists and their accomplices became unlawful belligerents, punishable by military commissions for offenses against the law
of war. The Court in Quirin stated that “[t]he offense was complete
when with that purpose [the saboteurs] entered . . . our territory in
time of war . . . .”122 On September 11, the attacks gave rise to a state

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. (emphasis added).
Rubin, supra note 32, at 110.
See supra notes 105–116 and accompanying text.
Military Order § 1(a), supra note 1, at 57,833.
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38.
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of armed conflict and thus, technically, mark the inception of this resulting state of conflict. Therefore, the attacks, properly considered,
are violations of the law of war. The ensuing state of armed conflict
cannot be considered separately from the events that began the conflict.
Still, there are significant differences between the state of armed
conflict in which the United States is presently engaged and the official wartime situation in which President Roosevelt authorized the
use of military commissions. Despite the president’s proclaimed “war
on terrorism,”123 the United States is not officially at war, as critics of
the Military Order have been quick to observe. Thus, while President
Roosevelt was acting pursuant to express congressional authority and,
therefore, according to Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in
Youngstown, was at the apogee of his power, President Bush’s
124
authority to convene commissions is less certain. Quirin nevertheless provides a valid constitutional basis for the president’s Order.
While President Bush lacks a congressional declaration of war, Congress did pass, and President Bush signed, the Authorization for Use
of Military Force Joint Resolution, which enables the president to use
“all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons” that he determines planned or aided the terrorist
attacks of September 11.125
Presidents have been able to rely on such congressional statements as the basis for their authority in armed conflicts even without
an official declaration of war, as demonstrated in Vietnam with the
126
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The power of Congress to declare war
has long been recognized as the power to define war. In Talbot v.
Seeman,127 for example, the Supreme Court recognized Congress’s
power to declare a “partial war” targeted at a specific form of enemy
aggression, even while the United States was not “at war” with the
enemy nation in the traditional sense.128 In Talbot, the Court ruled on

123. For a discussion of President Bush’s objectives, see Bumiller, supra note 21, at A1.
124. See supra notes 101–105 and accompanying text.
125. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
126. HENKIN, supra note 66, at 47; see also Sheffer, supra note 62, at 281 (arguing that the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution was the “functional equivalent” of a declaration of war).
127. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
128. Id. at 15; see also Crona & Richardson, supra note 37, at 361 (“A reasonable inference
from Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis [in Talbot] is that the War Powers Clause enabled Congress to authorize hostilities against a particular kind of predatory military activity without declaring a full-scale war against a nation in the traditional sense.”).
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certain measures Congress had adopted to deal with French privateers who were preying on American commercial vessels. Chief Justice Marshall held that “[C]ongress may authorize general hostilities . . . or partial hostilities, in which case the laws of war, so far as
they actually apply to our situation, must be noticed.”129 Therefore,
according to Talbot, the Constitution seems to recognize imperfect, or
130
“quasi,” war. The War Powers Clause allows Congress to authorize
the use of force against specific types of predatory military activities
without declaring a full-scale war.131
It is established, moreover, that in response to an attack upon the
United States, such as that which occurred on September 11, the
president has unquestioned constitutional authority as commander in
132
chief to defend the nation. Without a congressional declaration of
war, or even other authorization from Congress, the power of the
president to engage the armed forces in conflict to “repel invasion” is
clearly established.133 Congressional authorization to respond to an attack on the United States is simply assumed.134 Thus, in such circumstances, the president has the authority not only to repel the attack,
but also to wage to whatever extent necessary the war imposed on the
United States.135
Justice Stone’s opinion in Quirin seems to contemplate the
president’s authority to punish violations of the law of war through
military commissions, even in the absence of an express declaration of
war by Congress. Nowhere in the opinion is there any mention of the
need for a congressional declaration of war. It would be strange, furthermore, if in light of the Supreme Court’s recognition of imperfect
war, Quirin was confined only to expressly declared wars. That the
Court in Quirin may have contemplated the president’s power to establish military commissions in situations other than in an officially
129. Talbot, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 28.
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . . [t]o declare War,
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”).
131. Talbot, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 28.
132. See HENKIN, supra note 66, at 47–48 (“Without awaiting a Congressional declaration of
war, or other authorization from Congress, the power of the President to use the troops and do
anything else necessary to repel invasion is beyond question.”).
133. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862) (“If a war be made by invasion of a
foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist by force.”).
134. HENKIN, supra note 66, at 48.
135. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 668 (“He does not initiate the war, but is
bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority.”).
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declared war also seems plausible because of an ambiguous statement
toward the end of the opinion, which leaves room for a broad reading
of the case. “We have no occasion now,” said the Court, “to define
with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of
military tribunals to try persons according to the law of war.”136 It is
important to note that because the customary laws of war apply to
cases of international armed conflict as well as to officially declared
war, an actual declaration of war is not an essential condition for the
application of this body of law.137
Thus, the broadly worded Joint Resolution of September 14
seems to have put the president in a very strong position by giving
him the authority to conduct a constitutionally recognized “quasi
war.” President Bush therefore has the constitutional power under
Quirin to establish military commissions to punish offenses against
the law of war, even without an official declaration by Congress.
IV. REMAINING OBSTACLES TO THE USE OF COMMISSIONS:
EXTRALEGALITY UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND POLICY RAMIFICATIONS
A. Inconsistency With International Law
While the Bush administration’s Military Order technically
meets the constitutional requirements set forth in Ex parte Quirin, it
is inconsistent with international law, of which the laws of war are a
subset. Under existing international law, only states are recognized as
having legal “personality”—that is, the capacity to hold rights and to
be subject to obligations within the international legal system.138 The
laws of war, therefore, apply only to state actors, not to individuals.139
Despite the increase in incidents of international terrorism over the
past several decades, the laws of war do not make special provision
136. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45–46 (1942) (“We hold only that those particular acts constitute an offense against the law of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military
commission.”) (emphasis added).
137. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
8 (1956).
138. BYERS, supra note 15, at 75.
139. See W.J. Fenrick, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 25, 1985), in 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 112, 114 (1985) (“Except in the near
nonexistent case of the leveé on mass, individuals have no legal right to assume combatant status
on their own initiative. Individuals may perform the most monstrous acts for what they consider
to be the purest of motives.”).
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for terrorists or terrorist activities.140 Thus, for individuals to be tried
and punished for offenses against the laws of war, they must be acting
as agents of a recognized state.141 In Quirin, for example, the eight
saboteurs were agents of Nazi Germany and could thus be tried for
offenses in violation of the law of war.142 Those supposedly responsible for the attacks on September 11, by contrast, were acting not as
agents of any recognized state but, rather, as members of an independent terrorist organization.143 These suspects therefore cannot,
consistent with existing international law, be tried before military
commissions for violating the laws of war.
Recognizing this obstacle, the Bush administration is seeking to
effect a rapid change in customary international law so that the laws
of war can be made applicable to such nonstate actors as the members
144
of al Qaeda. The United States cannot, however, effectuate such a
change unilaterally. Customary international law results from a consensual process of consistent and general practice among states, which
they follow out of a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris.145 New
customary rules (e.g., the recognition that the law of war applies to
individual nonstate actors) must derive from the state practice of a
large number of states.146 States creating new customary rules must intend for those rules to exist and must adjust their practices accordingly.147
While a new rule recognizing that the laws of war may be applied
to independent terrorist organizations may be evolving, no consistent

140. Frits Kalshoven, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 25, 1985), in 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 114, 115 (1985).
141. See, e.g., Quirin, 317 U.S. at 35–36 (holding that saboteurs acting as agents for the Third
Reich could be prosecuted for violations of the laws of war).
142. Id.
143. See Bumiller, supra note 21, at A1 (stating that President Bush declared that al Qaeda
was a “terrorist network that . . . involved thousands of people in more than 60 countries”).
While al Qaeda is believed to have been supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, id.,
the Taliban was considered a rogue regime and was never officially recognized by the United
States. See AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN 118 (2000) (“Mullah Omar . . . periodically offer[ed] the
U.S. and U.N. an end to poppy cultivation, if the Taliban were given international recognition –
the first time a movement controlling 90 percent of a country had offered the international
community such an option.”).
144. Hearings, supra note 16 (testimony of Scott L. Silliman).
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1986); BYERS, supra
note 15, at 130.
146. BYERS , supra note 15, at 193.
147. Id.
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and general state practice has yet emerged.148 To apply the laws of war
to nonstate terrorist groups is to recognize implicitly that such entities
have international legal personality.149 The Bush administration has
announced, however, that the prisoners held at the U.S. Naval Base
in Guantanamo are not legally entitled to Prisoner of War (POW)
status under the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, although the detainees will be treated “in a manner consistent with the principles” of
the Convention.150 As a justification for the denial of POW status for
the al Qaeda suspects, the Bush administration has announced that
“Al-Qaeda is not a state party to the Geneva Convention; it is a foreign terrorist group. As such, its members are not entitled to POW
status.”151 Not only is this decision lacking in precedent,152 it applies
existing rules of international law, which recognize only states as
having legal personality, to what the Bush administration is seeking to
establish as a new customary rule. No consistent and general state
148. A declared practice by one state alone could, if acquiesced to by other states, constitute
a modification of customary international law. Id. at 133 (citing Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 109 (para. 207)). The United States,
however, is the only nation currently following this practice, and has been criticized for it. See,
e.g., Thalif Deen, Rights: Int’l Bodies Oppose U.S., Western Curbs on Freedom, INTER PRESS
SERV., Nov. 29, 2001 (detailing the concerns of Mary Robinson, U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, over planned trials before military commissions); Betsy Pisik, U.S. Ambassador
Brushes Off Rights Concerns, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A17 (describing sharp criticism
abroad of the November 13 Military Order establishing commissions); Sebastian Rotella, SaudiBacked Web Supports Terrorism, Book Asserts France: “Forbidden Truth” Details Kingdom’s
Role in Funding Bin Laden and Contends Geopolitical Concerns Have Influenced U.S. Policy,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at A11 (noting the French government’s criticism of the U.S. plan to
prosecute suspected terrorists before military commissions).
149. See BYERS, supra note 15, at 75:
In the international legal system the principle of personality has the consequence that
only those individuals or entities which have international legal personality are entitled to participate in the process of customary international law, and only those individuals or entities which have full international legal personality are entitled to participate fully in that process.
150. Press Release, supra note 22 (emphasis added). The Bush administration is presumably
seeking to avoid classifying the Taliban and al Qaeda suspects as POWs because such status
would, under Article 102 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, prevent them from being
tried by military commissions. Article 102 states “A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced
only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure
as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power.” Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 102, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Therefore, POW status in this case would entitle the Guantanamo suspects to trial by courts-martial,
pursuant to the UCMJ and entailing the full protections afforded to American military personnel. Id.
151. Press Release, supra note 22.
152. See Seelye, supra note 22, at A1 (discussing the Pentagon’s decision in Vietnam to
grant the Vietcong POW status).
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practice recognizing the legal personality of independent terrorist
groups can thus be determined to have evolved.
Even if such a custom does take shape, however, it cannot be applied retroactively through the November 13 Military Order to the
acts of September 11 without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause of
153
the Constitution. Customary international law is incorporated into
the federal common law.154 To apply a customary rule retroactively,
therefore, would quite clearly constitute an ex post facto law, as the
laws of war at the time of the September 11 attacks did not apply to
nonstate entities. The Order, as currently written, will thus remain an
extralegal action under existing international law.
B. Policy Implications Concerning the Use of Military Commissions
Assuming the possibility that the United States could bring about
a rapid change in existing customary international law so that the law
of war could be applied to nonstate terrorist groups, there are serious
policy considerations that mitigate against doing so. As one scholar
has noted, “One man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.”155 Such
a rule would open nongovernmental organizations, including relief
agencies, to politically motivated prosecutions throughout the developing world.156
Furthermore, to characterize members in terrorist organizations
as unlawful combatants and recognize them as subject to the laws of
war could mean that, in certain instances, members of terrorist groups
157
might be entitled to combatant and POW status. Such recognition
would thus confer a degree of political legitimacy and respectability
upon such groups that is neither warranted nor prudent.

153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
154. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (“[T]he Court is bound by the law of
nations which is part of the law of the land.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really
State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1824 (1998).
155. Fenrick, supra note 139, at 112.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 113 (“[I]f the [terrorist] organizations and their members accept and apply the
laws of armed conflict, they cannot be referred to as ‘terrorist organizations’ in any legal sense.
Compliance with the law brings respectability in its train.”). The Bush administration’s decision
not to classify officially the Guantanamo detainees as POWs has come under serious criticism as
inconsistent with the Geneva Convention. See Katherine Q. Seelye, A P.O.W. Tangle: What the
Law Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at A14 (quoting one critic of the decision as saying “since
the United States government engaged in armed conflict in Afghanistan—by bombing and undertaking other military operations—the Geneva Conventions clearly do apply to that conflict”).
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It has been suggested that the problems facing the president’s
Military Order could be remedied through legislation if Congress
were to amend 10 U.S.C. § 821 by authorizing commissions to prosecute not just violations of the laws of war but, also, violations of the
158
broader laws of nations, which includes terrorism. Such a change
would give the president a clear statutory basis to establish commis159
sions for the prosecution of terrorists. As with the proposed change
in customary international law, however, there are policy concerns
that the use of military commissions might hinder the international
campaign against terrorism. Spain, for example, has refused to extradite several suspected accomplices in the September 11 attacks to the
United States because of fears that the suspected accomplices will
face the death penalty.160 Proceeding with military commissions in
which defendants can be sentenced by two-thirds of the appointed
members161 is not likely to induce needed cooperation.
Trials in federal district courts or international war crimes tribunals would provide the most effective opportunities to convince the
international community that the United States is proceeding fairly.
With many Arab nations highly skeptical of the United States’ mili162
tary campaign, trials before military commissions are not the best
means by which to make the case against terrorism, and those responsible for it, to the world community. In a period during which the international campaign against terrorism has achieved significant success, it would be a mistake to give the terrorists any such benefit.
CONCLUSION
The November 13 Military Order authorizing noncitizens suspected of complicity in the attacks of September 11, 2001 to be tried
by specially convened military commissions was an extraordinary
measure designed to deal with an extraordinary problem—a surprise
attack by an independent enemy force that does not fit easily into existing legal categories of lawful or unlawful combatants.
158. Hearings, supra note 16 (testimony of Scott L. Silliman).
159. See id. (stating that such a change “would empower military commissions . . . to prosecute acts of terrorism outside the context of a recognized state of armed conflict”).
160. Frank Rich, Confessions of a Traitor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2001, at A23.
161. Department of Defense Military Commission Order, supra note 6, § 6(f).
162. Poll: Muslims Call U.S. ‘Ruthless, Arrogant’, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/
US/02/26/gallup.muslims/index.html (Feb. 26, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing a poll in which a majority of people interviewed in nine Muslim countries were found to
have unfavorable opinions of the United States and President Bush).
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Although, under Supreme Court precedent, the Order technically meets constitutional muster, it is inconsistent with existing international law, which holds that only state actors have legal personality
that subjects them to the laws of war. While this inconsistency may
change over time if new rules of customary international law develop,
the Military Order, as currently written, retroactively applies what
may be a developing customary rule in violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution. A new rule of international law, which
recognizes that the jus belli can be applied to such entities as al
Qaeda, may be applied to terrorists in the future if such a rule develops. There are, however, a host of serious policy considerations that
must be considered aside from the expediency of applying such a rule
as a means of prosecuting the war on terrorism.

